Natural resource modelling: accounting for gillnet size selectivity in dynamic deterrence model


Natural resource modelling: accounting for gillnet size selectivity in dynamic deterrence model


Sana Abusin

Qatar University
Social & Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI)


American Journal of Agricultural Research

This paper applied the two times dynamic deterrence model (DDM) and relax the assumption of perfect size selectivity in gillnet in order to specify factors that determine violation rate. The method of comparative statics is employed to derive analytical results on the sensitivity of optimal violation to a number of key factors of high relevance to compliance with regulation designed to protect against over fishing. Analytical results obtained with this extended DDM confirm findings of earlier empirical studies. The study concludes that in developing country artisanal fisheries where probability of detection, enforcement and levels of fine are typically low, and poverty levels deriving high impatience about the future (discount rate) violation rates are bound to be high. The relative magnitude of the effects of each of these factors on compliance with regulation however, remains an important empirical question that requires further investigation for prioritization of policy actions.


Keywords: fishery regulation, dynamic deterrence model, gillnet size selectivity

Free Full-text PDF


How to cite this article:
Sana Abusin. Natural resource modelling: accounting for gillnet size selectivity in dynamic deterrence model. American Journal of Agricultural Research, 2018,3:16. DOI:10.28933/ajar-2018-01-0201


References:

1 Abusin S ; R hassan, (2014): Legitimacy and ethics or deterrence factors: Which are more important for compliance with regulations among the artisanal fishers of Sudan? African Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics Volume 9 Number 3 pages 239-252
2 David J. Agnew1 *, John Pearce2 , Ganapathiraju Pramod3 , Tom Peatman2 , Reg Watson3 , John R. Beddington1,4, Tony J. Pitcher3(2016): Estimating the Worldwide Extent of Illegal Fishing. PLoS ONE 4(2): e4570. doi:10.1371/ journal.pone.0004570
3 Akpalu, W. (2008). Individual Discount Rate and Regulatory Compliance in a Developing Country Fishery. Journal of Environment and Development Economics: 13: 591-606.
4 Akpalu, W. (2009). A Dynamic Model of Mesh Size Regulatory Compliance in Fisheries. Working Paper Number 123. Farmingdale state college.
5 Andrew Bene, C, Hall.S and Ratner, B (2007) “Diagnosis and management of small-scale fisheries in developing countries: Fish and fisheries, 8, 227–240
6 AU-IBAR 2016. Economic, Social and Environmental impact of Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing in Africa. AU-IBAR Reports Prepared by: Bergh M O, Sowman M, Rampartab C, Leach K and P Lallemand
7 Becker, G. (1968). Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach. Journal of Political Economy, 76(2):169-217.
8 Boyd, H. J. (1966). Optimization and Sub optimization in Fishery Regulation: Comment. American Economic Review, 56(3):511-517.
9 Charles, A.T, Mazany, R.L and Cross, M.L,(1999) .The Economic of illegal fishing a Behavioral mode. Marine Resource Economics, 14: 95-110.
10 Chiang, Alpha C.,(1984). Fundamental methods of mathematical economics. Third edition. Mc Graw-Hill, Inc. Page 208.
11 Davis, M.L. (1988). Time and Punishment: an Intertemporal Model of Crime. Journal of Political Economy, 96(2):383-390.
12 Eggert .H and Lokina.2009 Regulatory compliance in Lake Victoria fisheries. Environment and Development Economics: page 1 of 21 C_ Cambridge University Press 2009
13 Furlong, W.J. (1991). The Deterrent Effect of regulatory Enforcement in the fishery. Land Economics, 67(1):116-129.
14 Hamid Um. Y 2000. Environmental impacts of surge industry waste water on White Nile area-Khartoum. Unpublished results. Master thesis.
15 Hatcher, A.,Jaffry, S. Thebaud, O and Bennett, E. (2000). Normative and Social Influences Affecting Compliance with Fishery Regulations. Land Economics, 76(3):448-461.
16 Hatcher, A. and D, Gordon. (2005). Future investigation into the factors affecting compliance with U.K. fishing Quota, land economics, 81(1):71-86.
17 Jenkins, S.P. (2004). Survival Analysis. Unpublished manuscript, Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of Essex, Colchester, UK. [Online]. Available : http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/teaching/degree/stephenj/ec968/pdfs/ec968lnotesv6.pdf
18 King, D.M and Sutinen, J.G. (2010). Rational noncompliance and the liquidation of Northeast ground fish resources. Marine Policy 34(1), 7-21.
19 Kuperan, K & Sutinen, J. (1998). Blue Water Crime: Deterrence, Legitimacy, And Compliance, In Fisheries. Law & society review, 32(2): 309-338.
20 Kuperan, K. and J.G.Sutinen. (1994), Compliance with Zoning Regulations in Malaysian Fisheries, paper presented to the 7th Conference of the International institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade, Taipei, Taiwan, 18-21 July 1994.
21 Leung, S.F. (1991). How to make the fine fit the corporate crime? : An analysis of static and dynamic optimal punishment theories. Journal of Public Economics, 45: 243 56.
22 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA) (2005). Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Current State and Trends Volume 1. Global Assessment Reports. Island Press: Washington.
23 Pauly, D., and D. Zeller.( 2016). Catch reconstructions reveal that global marine fisheries catches are higher than reported and declining. Nature Communications 7:9
24 Pauly, D. (1996). ITQ: the assumptions behind a meme. Review in Fish Biology and Fisheries, 6:109-12.
25 Srinivasa, J. T., 2005. State Regulation versus Co-management: Evidence from the Cochin Estuarine Fisheries in India. Environment and Development Economics 10, 97-117
26 Sterner, T.(2003).Policy instrument for environmental and natural resource management. RRF Press and the World Bank
27 Sumaila.R. U ; Alder. J. and Keith.H,(2006). Global scope and economics of illegal fishing. Marine policy, 30: 696-703.
28 Sutinen, J.G and Kuperan, K. (1999). A socio-economic theory of Regulatory Compliance. International journal of Social Economics, 26(1, 2, 3):174-93.