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European diplomacy and Kosovo issue during 1992-1998

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ABSTRACT

European diplomacy was in a dominant position after the loss of Soviet influence in the eastern European countries. The Yugoslav crisis was the first challenge for the European Community that could not stop the conflict in the areas of the former Yugoslavia. It did not appear determined in the initial positions of the Yugoslav crisis by attempting to maintain the Yugoslav federation, at a time when it was impossible for the coming of leaders seeking independence from the such federation.

The efforts of European diplomats at the London Conference, The Hague, and then onwards to that of Geneva failed to stop the expansion of the conflict towards Kosovo. Where peace was established only when at the same time diplomacy was combined with NATO air force.

Keywords: European Diplomacy, Kosovo, Yugoslavia, Conference

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The Yugoslav crisis, and then the consequence of the Kosovo crisis, represent a serious case of ethnic nationalism and confront the European foreign and security policy like never before with its greatest challenge of real policy.*1

Despite of all the other findings that the international community treated at an early stage the separation of Yugoslavia, however, it was questionable whether and in what form to intervene in the separation of a multiethnic country. The Europeans were convinced that they could solve the challenge in the Balkans: "This is the hour of Europe. It is not the hour of the Americans", Foreign Minister of Luxembourg Jacques Pos said after the outbreak of the first fighting in the then territory of Yugoslavia.*2 In the interview given to the "Nepsabadshag" newspaper, Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jazsensi said: Albania and Hungary pay much attention to the Yugoslav problem because both countries have national minorities in Yugoslavia. We support the European Union's policy on the issue of Yugoslavia.*3 Removing the Soviet threat provided conditions to strengthen its positions in the international policy agenda, the Yugoslav case served the European Union as a sort of foreign and security policy test as well as EU positioning as a political force*4. This position of Europeans was approved by the US Administration and thus the Europeans were faced with a serious test that would prove if the EU was capable of managing the crisis in Yugoslavia. On the contrary, this would imply the immediate need for US engagement in European affairs even after the end of the East-

West ideological confrontation. At the Hague Conference in Yugoslavia in 1991,*5 where its secession was sealed, Kosovo was not treated as a constitutive part of the Yugoslav state, although the unilateral abolition status made on March 23 1989*6 by the Serbian Parliament was known. Minister of Foreign Affairs of Austria Alojz Mok, during his stay in Washington on November 7, 1991, in front of the print and television media, stated: "The Yugoslav problem will be left to the United States if the European Union fails to resolve it itself.*7.

Dyrk Scherff rightly stated that "The potential of the war in Yugoslavia, which was driven by nationalism, fell into the deaf ears of EU, as the flow of information will not penetrate to the EU, respectively were not perceived on what the information services had to report to. Moreover, the events of the 1990s were completely ignored, where signs of Yugoslavia separation became apparent."*8 In June 1991, NATO military commander forces in Europe, General John Shalikashvili said: "NATO will not interfere in Yugoslavia because it is not within NATO's defensive zone".*9

Swiss scholar Urs Altermatt in the book "Ethno-nationalism in Europe"(1996),*10 wrote that the Yugoslav war between 1991 and 1995 found European diplomacy completely unprepared. European institutions were not able to detect (identify) national conflicts in the Balkans nor end the murderous wars there.

* 5 From this conference emerged also the Bandit Committee, which Kosovo did not count as a geographical term and leave it as one of the eight entities that made up the Yugoslav Federation.

* 6 Marc Weller, Challenged Citizenship, International Administration of the Kosovo War of Independence, p, 93, Koha, Pristina, 2011.

* 7 Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Albania, Dossier, 1609, B.vV11 / 2.

* 8 Dyrk Scherff: Die Fähigkeit der Europäischen Union zum aktiven Krisenmanagement: Lehren aus den Vermittlungsbemühungen 1991/1991 während des jugoslawischen Bürgerkrieges und der derzeitige Konflikt im Kosovo, in: Südosteuropa 7-8/1998, f. 299.

* 9 Dario Malnar, USA and Kosovo, p,120, Koha, Prishtinë, 2013.

* 10 Shih: Altermatt, Urs: Ethnonationalism. Tiranë, 1996.

* 1 Khs.: Griffiths, Stephen Iwan: Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. Threats to European Security, Oxford 1993, p. 125.

* 2 Zhak Pos, cited on Riding European Leaders Seek Common on Crisis, "New-York Times", 29.06.1991, p. 4; cited based on Erica A. Witte, Die Rolle der Vereinigten Staaten im Jugoslawien - Konflikt und der aussenpolitische Handlungsspielraum der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1990-1996), München, 2000, p. 6.

* 3 Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Albania, Hungarian Standing on the Albanian Issue Funds Kosovo, File no: 1182,1173,1151vitit 1990-91, Box: 39.38.

* 4 Dario Malnar, SHBA-ja dhe Kosova, p,119,Koha,Prishtinë, 2013.

In order to reach the Dayton and Paris Agreement,^{*11} as in the case of Kosovo war in 1999, American intervention became inevitable. Under the mediation of the United States of America and the EU involvement, the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement on December 14, 1995 was made possible, which ended the nearly four-year war in Bosnia & Hercegovina and Croatia.^{*12}

At the beginning of the conflict, the old nationalist models of Europe emerged in scene again, as if they had been in the history prison: the Germans defended Croatia, the French supported the Serbs^{*13}, while Albanians continued to lack the support of the international settlement centers.

Based on this, the European Union was accused of failing to put the Kosovo solution agenda when the time was ripe for such a thing". In conferences dedicated to Yugoslavia, which began in The Hague in 1991 and ended in Dayton 1995, this problem was again under the carpet.^{*14}

The London Conference that continued its work in Geneva (1992-1995)^{*15} examined Albanians just as much as they were needed for source information. In his letter, Congressman William H. Zeff, JR, addressed to President Bush, pointing out "the difficult situation whereby

experts predicted the approaching of the war between Albanians and Serbs, among others, was required the involvement of Kosovo Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova at the London Conference and possibly Ibrahim Rugova be hosted at a meeting to have informed the White House about the situation in Kosovo".^{*16}

In the official answer to Congressman Zeff's concern, the White House responded, pointing out that "The London Conference was organized to explain to all actors involved in the Yugoslav conflict our decisiveness and our partners, which will not allow the escalation of violence in Kosovo".^{*17}

The decisions of the London Conference did not bring any progress towards dialogue in the territory of Yugoslavia, in Kosovo the situation only went to deteriorate and increase the brutality of the Yugoslav invaders.^{*18}

This is also evidenced by the reports of international organizations and the press of the time describing a serious state of discrimination of the Albanian population in Kosovo. For the violation of human rights and by denying the education in school facilities, reported the press of the time and also the Helsinki Human Rights Committee and Amnesty International in their monthly and annual reports.

"Albanians were bitterly disappointed with the role assigned to them in London."^{*19} In December 1992, in a "Christmas Warning, President Bush informed Milosevic that the

* 11In October 1995, presidents of Serbia, Bosnia and Croatia agreed to gather at the air base of Wright-Patterson, Ohio, USA, to discuss ending violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The agreement was reached on November 21, 1995, and was formally signed in Paris on 14 December 1995. This agreement, otherwise known as the Dayton Agreement, ended three and a half years of war in Bosnia.

*12 In addition to the developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina, see: Marie-Janine Calic, *Krieg und Frieden in Bosnia and Herzegovina*, (Erweiterte Neuauflage), Frankfurt a.M., 1996; and Wolfgang Petritsch, *Bosnien und Herzegovina 5 Jahren nach Dayton. Hat der Friede eine Chance? Klagenfurt-Wien-Ljubljana-Tuzla-Sarajevo*, 2001.

*13 Altermatt finds the weakness of Western Europeans against the nationalist course in the Balkans, pointing out that geopolitical peace was acquired alongside ethnic divisions.

*14 Khs.: Dazu außerdem: Jens Reuter: *Die internationale Gemeinschaft und der Krieg in Kosovo*, in: *Südosteuropa*: Jg. 47, Nr. 7-8, 1998, p. 281-297 (2003).

* 15Philip E. and David Auerswald, *The Kosovo Conflict. A Diplomatic History Through Documents*, Kluwer Law International Cambridge / The Hague, 2000

* 16William H. Zeff, JR 1st District, New Hampshire, Congress of the United States House of Representatives Washington, DC20515-1901, August 4, 1992; The White House, Washington, October 23, 1992.

* 17Memo for Arnold Kanter – state, Paul Wolfowitz – OSD, Barry McCaffery – JCS, on Presidential Messages on Kosovo, November 18, 1992, National Security Council, Washington DC 20506.

* 18Jane Holl Files – Electronic Files Electronic Messages – Kosovo [1] [OA/ID CFO1566] Kosovo[2][OA/ID CFO1566] Kosovo [3] [OA/ID CFO1566] Kosovo [4] [OA /ID CFO1566] Electronic Messages - Kosovo [OA/ ID CF 01746] London Conference [1], [2], [3]. Jane Holl Files –Subject Files Balkans [OA/ ID CFO1747]

* 19Volfgang Petritsch, Robert Pihler, *Rruga e gjatë në luftë*, vep. e cit., f. 78

aggression in Kosovo will not be allowed".^{*20} This warning was reiterated by President Clinton administration on several cases during 1998.^{*21}

Kosovo attended the conference with what was known as "echo room", but without any substantial commitment to its cause. This was intended to be later transmitted as a minority issue at the Geneva Conference.

The EU's approach towards Milosevic was dominated for many years with efforts to reach - concessions through small steps and room of an interpretation which was based on the Constitution of year 1974. From this, European states did not support Albanian's demand for secession and independence of Kosovo. Changing the situation in Yugoslavia, Serbia's wars in the region, repressive politics against Albanians^{*22} left little room to hope that the Kosovo issue could be addressed by peaceful means. However, the Albanians' peaceful course did not attract much attention from European states, that Kosovo was an unresolved problem. Among other things, the EU did not want to open a new front to deal with the Kosovo issue.

Also, of course, at that time Kosovo was fading due to bloody conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia, in public and in political perception, although the situation in Kosovo was rated by the European Parliament as highly explosive in 1990 and feared that it can lead to a civil war. Anyway, Kosovo, at this time, in public and in political perception, was overlapped by bloody confrontations in Bosnia and Croatia, though the European Parliament, in 1990, estimated the situation in Kosovo as too explosive and warned it could come to an armed struggle.^{*23}

* 20Memo for Arnold Kanter – state, Paul Wolfowitz – OSD, Barry McCaffery – JCS, on Presidential Messages on Kosovo

* 21Dario Malnar, USA and Kosovo, p.131, Koha, Prishtina, 2013

* 22Amnesty International, AI Index: EUR 48/18/92, Yugoslavia Ethnic Albanians – Victims of torture and ill-treatment by police in Kosovo province, June 1992

* 23Entschließung der Europäischen Parlament zum Kosovo, vom 11. Oktober 1990, Amtsblatt, Nr. C 284/129, Abs. G.

In this line the Council of Europe expressed in the Lisbon Declaration (June 1992) the support for the process of consolidating democratic institutions, as well as for the "legitimate efforts of Kosovo's inhabitants for autonomy", which had to be addressed within the framework of the Conference of Peace for the former Yugoslavia.^{*24} Likewise, this statement emphasized the lack of recognition of the right of citizenship of the countries emerged through the war, namely the aspirations for independence in Southeast Europe for entities that did not have the republic status^{*25}. Even in the Edinburgh Declaration (December 1992), the EU called for the necessity of restoring "Kosovo's autonomy within Serbia".^{*26}

The European Union's efforts in this period were mainly directed at the prevention of violence and the outbreak of war in Kosovo. The efforts of the European Union after 1992 aimed at preventing the use of violence and the explosion of hostile acts in Kosovo. The nonviolent policy promulgated by Ibrahim Rugova and the state of Kosovo in the shadow that was created under his leadership found everywhere in the Western world moral support. Rugova tried persistently to internationalize the Kosovo problem.

* 24See: Europa Rat, Schlussfolgerung der Tagung des Europäischen Rates der Staats-und Regierungschefs am 26-27. Juni 1992 in Lissabon; Bericht der Aussenminister zur GASP, In: Borkenhagen, p. .228.

* 25The status of the republic, which for the Europeans became the determining principle for the recognition of citizenship, was enjoyed only by the Slavic nations, while the nationalities (Albanians) were not recognized such a right, because in this way the status of the divided nation would be accepted. Moreover, the non-recognition of the secession right in the European circles at this time was justified by the fear of the creation of new states in the territory of Yugoslavia could be a precedent for the nationalist ambitions of the Soviet peoples. So, because of political and security reasons, it was desirable to avoid a "Balkanization" of the Soviet empire's process of disintegration. Thus, ignoring the fact that Albanians since then constituted the third people in the framework of the former Yugoslavia. However, by the 1974 Constitution, they gained broad self-administration and by that, de facto - but not de jure, became nearly equal with other republican units. Moreover, see: Fee Rauert, Kosovo, p. 196-197.

* 26Stefan Troebst, Conflict in Kosovo: failure of prevention? An analytical documentation, 1992-1998, Flensburg, 1998 (ECMI Working Papers, 1, May 1998), p.49.

Subsequent experience showed that the European foreign policy in relation to the former Yugoslavia in the period 1990-1996 was suffering from the lack of will and the weakness of the leading role played failed to be played by neither Germany nor any other European country. This limited role of Europeans, with few differences, was also characterized during the Kosovo war period, 1997-1999, whereby the EU

lost international prestige and credibility as an impartial party.^{*27} As in the case of Bosnia, in the Kosovo war also, Europeans were forced to see how the Americans, in front of their doors, were taking over the lead in negotiating and managing the crisis. Thus, the initiatives in the field of crisis management passed from the EU to the UN, and then to the United States. At this stage, the European initiatives, which from 1st of November 1993 were undertaken by Foreign Common Policy and Security were limited to the humanitarian sphere. Particularly, the role of the United States in the Kosovo war led to the reorientation of Euro-Atlantic relations and triggered the EU's commitment, respectively its reorientation in the foreign policy plan. However, even after that, the European Union was unable to elaborate and develop a common foreign strategy and policy, nor to speak with one voice about the Kosovo problem. The EU states, after the Dayton Conference, agreed to normalize relations with the remaining Yugoslavia after the fundamental improvement of the human rights situation in Kosovo.

As a result of this discourse, in early 1996 France hastened to recognize Milosevic's Yugoslavia, ^{*28} a step which was followed soon

^{*27} The main European chancellery walked through their special national roads without reaching a common action. In the process of Yugoslavia's disintegration, Germany was accused by critics of pro-Slovenian and pro-Croat unilateral attitudes, while British and French official politics appeared as proserbs by international media, especially during the war in Bosnia&Hercegovina.

^{* 28}The so-called Third Yugoslavia (1992-2003) was created between Serbia and Montenegro and was Milosevic's claim to inherit the state's foretaste. In foreign literature for years the term Yugoslavia left for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia

by other EU member states^{*29}. This again testified that the European Union was incapable of coordinating its policy towards Belgrade and carrying out the step of recognizing under jointly agreed conditions. The European Parliament, referring to continuing violations of human rights in Kosovo, criticized members who had recognized Belgrade. Likewise, the call that European Council in April 1996 directed Belgrade to recognize Kosovo "a high degree of autonomy" was insufficient. This was not an encouraging stand for Kosovo, as it confirmed the position that the European Union was opposed to changing the territorial status quo and re-identifying the old ideas of "dialogue" and "confidence-building measures"^{*30}. And without doubt this was a strategy that could not bring any progress towards addressing the Kosovo problem.

Unlike the European Union countries, the US did not recognize RF of Yugoslavia. There were no US embassies in Belgrade, and when Washington calls the unwanted state by name, it always talks about "Serbia and Montenegro". Because of Kosovo, Washington, with the help of the United Nations Security Council, set up the so-called "external wall" of sanctions against the remaining Yugoslavia.

In these circumstances, the political consciousness of the Kosovo Albanians begins

and Montenegro), which was denied the claim to inherit the continuance of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which, since November 1991, was officially admitted that he entered the dissolution process. The Badinter Commission estimates that, with the dissolution of Yugoslavia, the legal-international subjectivity of that state had been completed since July 1992. While in 2003 these two countries renamed Yugoslavia, created the Union Serbia-Montenegro and, according to the agreement, it says that at the time of its separation, all remaining Yugoslavia's obligations (Serbia-Montenegro), including Resolution 1244, will pass to Serbia. The Serbia-Montenegro Union, which is considered Javier Solana's product and is often called ironically "Solania", ended in May 2006. With this, Kosovo remained the last unresolved issue in the Balkans and under the UN international protectorate, which de jure has remained in force even after declaring independence in 2008, as Russia opposes changing Resolution 1244.

^{*29} Sabrina P, Ramet: Die politische Strategie der Vereinigten Staaten in der Kosovo-Krise – Parteipolitik und nationales Interesse, aus: Reuter/Clewing: Der Kosovo Konflikt, p. 369

^{* 30}Troebst, Stefan: Conflict in Kosovo, p. 49.

and before the state forming movement there is a need to revise its political position, namely the formation of new political-military organizations. As a consequence of the permanent violation of Albanian rights and the deterioration of the socio-economic situation in 1996, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)^{*31} appeared, which not only influenced the end of the disadvantaged *status quo* for Albanians, but also accelerated NATO military involvement, in this context, also of EU member states in finding a solution to the problem of Kosovo.

And if internationalization of this issue was acquired, as there was the case for example, the Kinkel initiative – Vedrin of the autumn 1997^{*32} it must have been required earlier in the context of improving the status quo in the points of autonomy, human rights and minority rights^{*32}. Though this excluded the option of an independent Kosovo state, Belgrade considered it a "mix in domestic affairs".

The policy of the governments of EU member states in relation to Kosovo for a long time played a secondary role. This defensive position determined the reactivation of the Contact Group for Balkans, consisting of USA, Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany and Russia, and in September 1997 it considered the Kosovo problem^{*33}. In the spirit of previous EU statements, the Contact Group also called for a dialogue between Kosovo Albanians and Serbia. This pragmatic position was further specified in the Moscow Declaration of September 1997. According to the Contact Group, neither the violent status quo nor the

demand of the Albanian party for Kosovo's statehood was acceptable. In a strident effort for prudence and balance, in the London Declaration of 9 March 1998, the Contact Group condemned the brutal conduct of Serbian security forces in Kosovo, as well as the military actions of the Kosovo Liberation Army. At the same time, the European Union insisted on other sanctions against Belgrade, ignoring the experience of previous years that additional sanctions would not have an impact on the Milosevic's regime. The blockade of foreign loans and debts, the ban on investments in the remaining Yugoslavia and the ban on flights with the JAT airline have had no effect. Sanctions, on the contrary, worked to show that the European Union did not remain indifferent.

Since violence and terror in Kosovo continued during 1998 as well and did not appear to be ready for reconciliation, Richard Holbrook, under the threat of NATO intervention, forced Milosevic to accept sending to Kosovo 2000 unarmed OSCE observers.^{*34} At the same time, the agreement between Holbrook-Milosevic predicted that NATO intelligence planes would fly over Kosovo under the ("Eagle's Eye")^{*35} operation.

Following this venture, European diplomacy, under the Contact Group leadership, decided that in February 1999, to confront in the Rambouillet Peace Campaign representatives of Kosovo and Serbia to find a solution for Kosovo. The Rambouillet meeting should have been oriented according to the model of the Dayton Conference, which had ended the war in Bosnia.^{*36}

* 31Reuter, Jens: Die internationale Gemeinschaft und das Kosovo-Problem 1991-1997; Lipsius, Stephan: "Untergrundorganisationen im Kosovo - Ein Überblick" in: *Südosteuropa*, 1-2/1998, p. 75-82.

* Newspaper, Bujku, September, 1997, Prishtina.

*32 Yes there.

* 33The Contact Group was established officially in April 1994, as the Contact Group for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Initially, the Contact Group was made up of foreign affairs ministers of France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United States and Great Britain. In May, following Italy's great perseverance, the Contact Group expanded with Italy as well. Since autumn 1997, the Contact Group has started to act as a central coordinating body for the Kosovo crisis.

* 34Calic, Marie-Janine *Die Jugoslawienpolitik des Westens seit Dayton*, "Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B34/99, 20 gusht 1999, p.22-23.

* 35On January 22, the Contact Group gathers in London to lay the foundations for the Peace Conference in Rambouillet of France.

* 36Ukshini, Sylë: *Kosovo and the West*, Rilindja, Prishtinë, 2001, p.76-80

The basis for the talks was the peace plan, which only 20% could be considered as material that could be discussed. As a whole, the balance of the Rambouillet Conference was quite different from the positive one. For seventeen days in a row conversations took place, where delegations spoke only with intermediaries, and not with each other.

The concept of the Conference, the EU and other countries of the Contact Group, represented the concept of the fact that the solution was solely required under an autonomy within the framework of the remaining Yugoslavia^{*37}, which it was contrary to the goal of Albanians for independence. But since it was left open to make the final decision on Kosovo's status, which was foreseen for three years in Rambouillet, and Kosovo could become a state, Belgrade rejected the agreement. In a situation where war was the only option, as Kosovo had accepted the deal, NATO European partners, although initially did not account for the development of an air war, solidarized with air strikes against Serbian military targets. In fact, EU's participation in air strikes, which came as a result of the lack of a political solution^{*38}, against Milosevic's repressive policy was debated earlier in the political circles of member states, but it was required to be implemented under UN mandate. This was determined by the refusal of France and Italy, who requested for each intervention to pass through the UN mandate. However, in order to maintain the unity of the North Atlantic Alliance and with this in order not to interfere into relations between Europe and the United States, European states did not step back into unilateral action, but joined NATO air operations, taking an active role in finding a political solution during the course of the war. This European policy stance, in spite of the limited military capabilities, as well as the continued efforts to include Russia on board, paved the way for the G8 initiative

and then drafting a peaceful blueprint from the EU, which then was accepted by Slobodan Milosevic. The fundamental change of EU foreign policy, renouncing the reserved approach to military intervention, and Milosevic's interest in finally signing the peace plan in the absence of another breakthrough resulted in the end of the Kosovo war through Security Council resolution 1244^{39*} and the signing of the Military Technical Agreement in Kumanovo (June 1999)^{*40}, and then the march of KFOR troops in Kosovo. Undoubtedly, the implementation of the "Fisher Plan", which became part of the EU diplomatic agenda, was of decisive importance for Kosovo withdrawal from Belgrade administrative and military control, which could not be achieved without an intervention of NATO military, the first in the history of the alliance, was led to a sovereign state.

*"A new balance between the principles of international law, namely state sovereignty and the consideration of universal human rights should be further discussed. Conflict for Kosovo, intervention against the killing of people and the worst crime against humanity, let us hope that it is also the beginning of such an international learning process",^{*41} wrote Rudolf Scharping in his book "Wir dürfen nicht wegsehen- Der Kosovo Krieg und Europa."*

Conclusion

European diplomacy was not unique in its stance on the crisis in the Yugoslav federation that began after 1990.

* 39Security Council Resolution 1244 was adopted on 10 June 1999, following the agreement for the withdrawal of Serbian troops from Kosovo. This resolution defines Kosovo's political status as a UN protectorate, and provides Kosovo's administration to this international organization.

According to this resolution, the UN has the responsibility for civilian administration while NATO for security in Kosovo.

Although the resolution makes Kosovo a UN protectorate, in this resolution several times it is mentioned that Kosovo is part of Yugoslavia.

* 40Enver Sopjani, *Summary of international acts for Kosovo 1999-2004*, p.101-107, Prishtinë, 2005

*41 Rudolf Scharping 2001: *Wir dürfen nicht wegsehen. Der Kosovo-Krieg und Europa*, Berlin 1999, p.222-223.

* 37Christopher R. Hill, *Outpost Life on the Frontlines of American Diplomacy*, p. 148, Simon & Schuster, New York Edition October 2014.

* 38Yes there.

The organization of peaceful Conferences for Yugoslavia that began in London, Hague and continued in Geneva, with their decision for peaceful solutions failed to halt the bloody conflict that involved most of the former Yugoslavia. After the Dayton Agreement and the failure of the education agreement in Kosovo, the peaceful movement proclaiming the solution of the Kosovo problem through dialogue had begun to be criticized by the general public in Kosovo. At this time the spread of radical movements; such as the formation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) began, that was the only opportunity for international diplomatic circles to take seriously the resolution of the Kosovo problem.

After KLA operations in some areas in Kosovo, the actions of Serbian military and police forces also started with crimes against the civilian population. These actions forced the Contact Group to take important decisions to prevent bloodshed in Kosovo. In this context were the decisions to organize a peaceful conference for Kosovo in Rambouillet, France. Decisions following the air strikes against the targets of the Yugoslav forces, with the UN resolution, came to establish peace in Kosovo.

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