Logistics Service Supply Chain service quality inspection results contract coordination under information asymmetry

Logistics Service Supply Chain service quality inspection results contract coordination under information asymmetry

Tao Dai

Institute of Logistics Science & Engineering, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China.

International Journal of Industrial and Business Management

Aiming at the two-level service supply chain, which is dominated by logistics service provider (LS) and logistics service Platform operator (LP), it is faced with the problem of uncertain market demand and asymmetric information of logistics capacity service failure rate. Under the income distribution mode of LS and LP income sharing, this thesis uses the Stackelberg game principle to propose a cost-sharing compensation contract based on the result of capacity service quality test to coordinate the supply chain. The results show that the compensation contract of cost allocation can effectively solve the problem of information asymmetry and realize the growth of supply chain income. However, the overall supply chain income has not been maximized due to the inability to achieve the simultaneous coordination of LP’s effort level and capacity supply decision.

Keywords: Information asymmetry; Quality testing; Capacity service failure rate; Compensation contract; Level of effort

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How to cite this article:
Tao Dai. Logistics Service Supply Chain service quality inspection results contract coordination under information asymmetry. International Journal of Industrial and Business Management, 2019; 3:15. DOI: 10.28933/ijibm-2019-05-2006


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